The US isn’t the only country voting on Nov 5. This small Pacific nation is also holding an election – and China is watching

The United States isn’t the only country with a big election on November 5. Palau, a tourism-dependent microstate in the north Pacific, will also vote^[1] for a new president, Senate and House of Delegates that day.

Why does this election matter? Palau is one of the few remaining countries^[2] that has diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

In addition, elections in the Pacific – and the horse-trading to form government that follows – often present a chance for China to steal an ally away from Taiwan in its efforts to further reduce the self-ruling island’s diplomatic space.

For example, there was speculation^[3] Tuvalu could flip its allegiance from Taipei to Beijing based on the outcome of January’s election, but the government decided to remain in Taiwan’s camp.

Another Pacific nation, Nauru, did flip^[4] from Taiwan to China in January, less than 48 hours after Taiwan’s own presidential election.

I recently visited Palau as part of a research project examining China’s growing extraterritorial reach, and was curious to see if the balance is shifting towards Beijing in the lead-up to this year’s election.

What’s at stake in Palau’s election?

Palau, a nation of 16,000 registered voters^[5], has close ties to the US. It was under US administration^[6] after the second world war and recently signed a “Compact of Free Association^[7]” with the US. Palau also has a similar presidential system of government, with a president directly elected by the people every four years.

However, there are also some key differences: there are no political parties^[8] in Palau, nor is there any replica of the absurd Electoral College voting system.

The archipelago also has extremely polite yard signs (“Please consider[…]”, “Please vote for […]” and “Moving forward together”). Alliances are based more on clan and kinship relations than ideology (although that’s not entirely dissimilar to the US).

This year’s presidential race is between the “two juniors”: the incumbent, Surangel Whipps Junior, and the challenger, Tommy Remengensau Junior. If either man were facing a different opponent, he would win easily. Nearly all of Palau’s political insiders deem this contest too close to call.

Whipps has been in office since 2021. Accompanied by his beloved father, a former president of the Senate and speaker of the House in Palau, he is expected to door-knock each household at least four times.

Remengensau isn’t a political newbie, either. He’s been president for 16 of Palau’s 30 years as an independent state. In the comments section of the YouTube live feed^[9] of a recent presidential debate, one person asked, “you’ve had four terms, how many more do you need?”

Whipps copped flak for his tax policy, but the comments and the debate itself reached Canadian levels of politeness. As the debate wound up, the rivals embraced warmly – befitting their closeness (they are actually brothers-in-law^[10]) and their lack of discernible ideological differences.

A ‘pro-Beijing’ candidate in the race?

However, there is one issue that has the potential to drive a wedge between the two candidates: the China–Taiwan rivalry.

In a recent article^[11] for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Remengensau was described as a “pro-Beijing” candidate who might be inclined to switch Palau’s diplomatic relations to Beijing, cheered on by the “China-sympathetic” national newspaper, Tia Belau.

Remengensau’s reaction^[12] to the ASPI piece was genuine fury, and aside from a few fly-in lobbyists from the US, no one in the country has taken the characterisation seriously. Yes, he is less pro-US than Whipps, reciting the “friends to all, enemies to none” mantra beloved by Pacific leaders in the debate. But that’s some distance from being “pro-Beijing”.

Other outside commentators have also weighed in with similar viewpoints. Recent pieces by right-wing think tanks, the Heritage Foundation^[13] and the Federation for the Defence of Democracies^[14], have pushed a similar line that every Pacific nation is just “one election away from a [People’s Republic of China]-proxy assuming power and dismantling democracy”.

What’s really behind concerns of Chinese influence

The basis for both allegations in the ASPI piece is a fascinating investigation^[15] by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). The story detailed an influence attempt led by a local businessman from China, Hunter Tian, to set up a media conglomerate in Palau with the owner of the newspaper Tia Belau, a man named Moses Uludong. (I played a small part in the investigation.)

The proposed conglomerate had eyebrow-raising links to China’s secret police and military. But COVID killed the deal, and today, the newspaper runs press releases from Taiwan’s embassy without changing a word.

Palau’s media is also ranked as the most free^[16] in the Pacific, and Tia Belau is a central part of this healthy media ecosystem.

Uludong is a pragmatic businessman who’s no simple cheerleader for Beijing, explaining^[17] to OCCRP’s journalists last year:

The Chinese, they have a way of doing business. They are really not open.

This doesn’t mean Chinese operations in Palau will stop, though. Representatives of the Chinese government like Tian, who is the president of the Palau Overseas Chinese Federation and has impressive family links to the People’s Liberation Army, will keep trying to influence Palau’s elites and media.

Evidence uncovered by Palau’s media suggests some of their elites are vulnerable to capture. In recent months, the immigration chief stepped down^[18] for using his position “for private gain or profit”, while the speaker of the House of Delegates was ordered to pay^[19] US$3.5 million (A$5.2 million) for a tax violation, in part due to an irregular lease to a Chinese national.

Chinese triads are also now involved in scam compounds^[20] and drug trafficking^[21] in Palau, which has done little to burnish China’s image among Palauans.

Playing into China’s hands

So, can we expect a dramatic Palau diplomatic flip after November’s election? Not anytime soon.

But labelling respected leaders and media outlets as “pro-Beijing” with no basis, and fabricating a Manichean struggle in a nation where there’s plenty of goodwill for the US, won’t cause China’s boosters in Palau to lose sleep.

Egging on US agencies to “do something” to counter Chinese influence in the Pacific, such as a poorly thought-out influence operation^[22] run by the Pentagon in the Philippines during the pandemic, will just play into Beijing’s hands. In the Pacific, secrets don’t stay secret for long. And if you call someone “pro-China” for long enough, one day you might get your wish.

References

1. ^{^} will also vote (journals.sagepub.com)
2. ^{^} few remaining countries (en.mofa.gov.tw)
3. ^{^} speculation (www.theguardian.com)
4. ^{^} flip (www.theguardian.com)
5. ^{^} 16,000 registered voters (palauelection.org)
6. ^{^} US administration (www.state.gov)
7. ^{^} Compact of Free Association (www.lowyinstitute.org)
8. ^{^} no political parties (journals.sagepub.com)
9. ^{^} live feed (www.youtube.com)
10. ^{^} brothers-in-law (www.rnz.co.nz)
11. ^{^} article (www.aspistrategist.org.au)
12. ^{^} reaction (islandtimes.org)
13. ^{^} Heritage Foundation (www.heritage.org)
14. ^{^} Federation for the Defence of Democracies (www.airuniversity.af.edu)
15. ^{^} investigation (www.occrp.org)
16. ^{^} most free (pacificfreedomforum.com)
17. ^{^} explaining (islandsbusiness.com)
18. ^{^} stepped down (islandtimes.org)
19. ^{^} ordered to pay (islandtimes.org)
20. ^{^} scam compounds (omny.fm)
21. ^{^} drug trafficking (islandtimes.org)
22. ^{^} influence operation (www.reuters.com)