when 500 million Chinese change their spending habits, the world feels it

China’s economic rocket ride appears to be ending – or slowing, at least. Growth has declined from 8.4% in 2021^[1] to 4.5% today^[2], youth unemployment has climbed to 16.9%^[3], and cities are filled with unfinished buildings after the collapse of property developer Evergrande^[4] in 2024.

For a while now, a phrase has been buzzing on Chinese social media sites Weibo and RedNote^[5] to describe what’s happening: “garbage time^[6]”.

Borrowed from basketball slang, it refers to the final minutes of a game whose outcome is already decided^[7]. The best players sit out. The bench players take over. No one tries as hard because there’s less at stake.

The term caught on last year and seems to capture a mixture of sadness and dark humour. Basically, people now seem to expect less. It’s not so much an economic crash as a slow decline of hope^[8].

For those born in the 1980s and 1990s, who grew up during China’s four decades of fast growth^[9], this is a major shift. Wages aren’t climbing^[10], houses are losing value^[11] and jobs in tech and finance are harder to find^[12].

But “garbage time” is also making room for younger and middle-class Chinese to redefine success and contentment. With good jobs, luxury goods and home ownership now harder to attain^[13], a generation is questioning what matters most in a changing socioeconomic landscape.

From Prada to ‘living light’

Only ten years ago, many in China’s middle classes^[14] were chasing big dreams: they bought homes and designer brands, and sent their children overseas for schooling. “Getting rich is glorious,” former leader Deng Xiaoping once said^[15].

Many Chinese fully embraced this idea. According to a 2021 study of millennial consumption habits, 7.6 million young Chinese^[16] spent an average of 71,000 yuan (US$ 10,375) on luxury goods in 2016, approximately 30% of the global luxury market.

Now they appear to be changing course, putting that kind of spending on hold^[17] because of financial anxiety.

Take the rising phenomenon of “tang ping^[18]”, for instance, which is seeing more young people embrace “living light” and rejecting hustle culture. Or the notion of “run xue^[19]” or “run philosophy” – literally the study of how to leave China.

Young Chinese are marrying later^[20], too, with rising wedding costs and changing attitudes to traditional family values seen as the main reasons.

Shopping habits appear to confirm the trends. Xianyu, China’s biggest online used-goods seller^[21], reached 181 million users in 2024. Sales topped one trillion yuan, ten times the 2018 level. Chinese car maker BYD now outsells prestige foreign brands^[22].

This is about more than just saving money. Traditionally, Chinese culture has valued career success and family status^[23], but job scarcity and falling house prices are challenging old assumptions.

Young Chinese are now questioning the value of hard work^[24] in a system that may no longer reward it. They increasingly value personal wellbeing over chasing status. If the trend continues, it could see a new sense of middle-class identity emerge.

Ripples hit the world

The global implications of all this are significant. When 500 million people^[26] change their spending habits, global markets notice.

A once favoured brand like Apple has lost ground while local brand Huawei gained^[27]. Homegrown sportswear maker Li Ning is challenging Nike^[28]. Companies that planned for seemingly endless Chinese growth are having to recalculate. Along with other regulatory and geopolitical complexities^[29], this makes planning harder.

School and work life is changing too. China’s intensive education system has seen pushback from some students^[30] and its “996 work culture^[31]” (9am to 9pm, six days a week) is fading.

Overall, China’s economic sprint is slowing to a steadier pace. And this deceleration of the economic model that drove the nation’s rise presents major challenges for its government.

With Donald Trump’s tariff policies looming in the background, China’s imports declined at the start of this year. Exports still grew, but at a much slower rate^[32].

The middle-class has been both the engine and the beneficiary of China’s extraordinary growth. But with 40% having seen their wealth decline in recent years^[33], robust consumer confidence cannot be assumed.

Whether this is a long-term trend or merely a strategic adjustment, for now it seems a new economic identity is emerging. Either way, one thing is certain: when the world’s second-largest economy changes how it spends, everyone feels it.

References

1. ^{^} Growth has declined from 8.4% in 2021 (www.china-briefing.com)
2. ^{^} 4.5% today (www.reuters.com)
3. ^{^} 16.9% (www.reuters.com)
4. ^{^} collapse of property developer Evergrande (theconversation.com)
5. ^{^} Weibo and RedNote (www.reuters.com)
6. ^{^} garbage time (www.forbes.com)
7. ^{^} outcome is already decided (bleacherreport.com)
8. ^{^} slow decline of hope (www.imf.org)
9. ^{^} China’s four decades of fast growth (www.bbc.com)
10. ^{^} Wages aren’t climbing (www.bloomberg.com)
11. ^{^} houses are losing value (thediplomat.com)
12. ^{^} jobs in tech and finance are harder to find (www.bloomberg.com)
13. ^{^} harder to attain (www.tandfonline.com)
14. ^{^} China’s middle classes (chinapower.csis.org)
15. ^{^} former leader Deng Xiaoping once said (theconversation.com)
16. ^{^} 7.6 million young Chinese (doi.org)
17. ^{^} spending on hold (www.scmp.com)
18. ^{^} tang ping (www.scmp.com)
19. ^{^} run xue (www.theguardian.com)
20. ^{^} marrying later (www.sixthtone.com)
21. ^{^} China’s biggest online used-goods seller (www.statista.com)
22. ^{^} outsells prestige foreign brands (www.wsj.com)
23. ^{^} valued career success and family status (www.sciencedirect.com)
24. ^{^} questioning the value of hard work (www.sciencedirect.com)
25. ^{^} B.Zhou/Shutterstock (www.shutterstock.com)
26. ^{^} 500 million people (www.scmp.com)
27. ^{^} lost ground while local brand Huawei gained (www.morningstar.com)
28. ^{^} Li Ning is challenging Nike (www.morningstar.com)
29. ^{^} regulatory and geopolitical complexities (www.hinrichfoundation.com)
30. ^{^} pushback from some students (foreignpolicy.com)
31. ^{^} 996 work culture (www.channelnewsasia.com)
32. ^{^} much slower rate (www.reuters.com)
33. ^{^} wealth decline in recent years (www.scmp.com)